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Institutional theory has explained the greater prevalence of many strategic actions by
increases in their legitimacy over time, but it has not explained how firms choose among
actions backed by competing institutional logics. We address this topic by linking in-
stitutional logics with the theory of organizational coalitions and power to predict how
such choices are affected both by external influence (through ownership) and by internal
influence (through shared decision making). In particular, we analyze how the old state
socialism logic and the new market capitalism logic competed to influence Chinese
firms’ mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find that these institutional logics affected
M&A decisions via the coalitions committed to each logic—coalitions whose balance of
power reflected the external power source of ownership and the internal power source
of board representation. We also find that each coalition’s strength changed as the
market capitalism logic became more established during China’s economic transition,
and that investors viewed M&As by firms with high state ownership skeptically.
INTRODUCTION
A firm’s use of power tomake choices is a common
theme in the theory of decision making (Cyert &
March, 1963; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). However, this
theme is often countered by research emphasizing
how the behavior of firms is driven by institutionali-
zation in that uncertainty is resolved via mimetic be-
havior (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Such institutional
effects on firms’ decisions have been documented in
mergerwaves (Haleblian,McNamara,Kolev,&Dykes,
2012; Stearns & Allan, 1996), technology adoption
(Greve, 2011; Simon & Lieberman, 2010), and market
entry (Ethiraj & Zhu, 2008; Haveman, 1993). Yet
decision-making theory is still important because,
even though institutions drive some behavior, they
also enable firms to make different kinds of choices
whenactions thatarediscouragedbyone institutional
regime are more accepted or encouraged by another
(Ahmadjian &Robinson, 2001; Peng, 2003; Thornton,
1995). Institutional change triggers theuseofpower in
decision making precisely because established and
new behaviors are in contention.
The increased recognition of the firm’s options
even in institutional environments has led to work
that examines how firm goals (Lounsbury, 2007) and
power structures (Durand& Jourdan, 2012) influence
the adoption of a particular course of action. This
issue is central to research on institutional logics,
which are belief systems that provide rationales for
organizational goals and actions and that help initi-
ate such strategic actions as acquisitions (Friedland
&Alford, 1991; Thornton, 1995; Thornton, Ocasio, &
Lounsbury, 2012). It is not unusual for multiple in-
stitutional logics to coexist, in which case the firm is
faced with conflicting goals and prescriptions for
behavior. Thus firms often must not only adapt
to a new institutional environment but also distin-
guish among the relative merits of multiple logics
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Greenwood, Raynard,
Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011), each with
unique consequences for firm strategy and actions.
There is a need for theory to address firms’ strategic
choices in an environment characterized by multiple
institutional logics (Kim, Kim, & Hoskisson, 2010;
Yiu, Hoskisson, Bruton, & Lu, 2014). In this paper, we
develop such theory andmake three contributions: (1)
we develop decision-making theory that incorporates
choices among actions supported by contesting in-
stitutional logics; (2) we extend the theory of logics to
consider the power sources of each contesting logic;
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and (3) we examine the power struggle among the
coalitions involved in decision making as a driver of
shifts in the firm’s institutional logic.
When institutional environments enable multiple
but conflicting actions, a key issue is how—in
decision-making groups—the advocates of each ac-
tion affect the decision that is made (e.g., Chin,
Hambrick, & Treviño, 2013; Lounsbury, 2001). Re-
solving this issue is facilitated by viewing firm de-
cision making as the result of management coalitions
and power struggles. Many decisions are based on
coalitions built from advocates of an actionwho agree
on it for different reasons (Cyert &March, 1963), with
the result that organizations become markets for in-
fluence and control in which internal coalitions are
built to resolve themultiple incompatible demands of
powerful external actors (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
This influence can be seen as a negotiation between,
on the one hand, external stakeholders (with varying
amounts of power) seeking to control management
and, on the other hand, management seeking to
maintain its control (Hill & Jones, 1992).
In this paper, we aim to predict firm behavior by
linking institutional logics with arguments predi-
cated on coalitions and their relative power. One
advantage of this approach is that it leads directly to
the questions of how best to identify: (1) the advo-
cates of a logic who form a coalition; (2) the goals of
each coalition; and (3) the power held by the co-
alition. These issues are seldom examined thor-
oughly byother theoretical viewpoints. For example,
research that views firm behavior as determined by
the institutional environment typically ignores de-
cision making, and research that views decision
making as drivenmainly by cognitive factors usually
fails to consider the sources and use of power (Wry,
Cobb, & Aldrich, 2013). To predict the outcomes
of contested decisions backed by coalition power,
we examine certain strategic actions that—despite
being encouraged and/or facilitated by institutional
change—remain controversial because of conflict
between followers of competing institutional logics
(Friedland&Alford, 1991; Thornton&Ocasio, 1999).
We predict the decisions that are ultimately made
based on variables describing the strength of each
coalition built by the advocates of one of the in-
stitutional logics.
The context we chose for our study is the transi-
tional period of the Chinese enterprise system from
state control (with societal goals) to increasing pri-
vate control (with profitability goals). That period
featured conflicting institutional logics advocated by
various sources of power, and the contest of these
logics evolvedwith the institutionalization of amore
market-oriented economy (Yiu et al., 2014). This
period has provided the context for many studies
(Bruton, Peng, Ahlstrom, Stan, & Kehan, 2015) that
focus on the behavior of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), but an important aspect of this economic
transition that is often overlooked is the many
privately-owned enterprises entering the economy
while the SOEs were being (partially) privatized. In
this environment, firms with a diverse governance
structure were exposed to both of the contesting
logics. This provides us with the opportunity to
study the competing institutional logics of state so-
cialism and market capitalism in both private en-
terprises (listed on the stockmarket andwith no state
ownership) and partially-privatized SOEs (listed but
not entirely independent of state ownership).
This paper proceeds by first considering how
a theory of coalitions in decision making can help
predict firm-level behavior influenced by in-
stitutional logics. Institutional logics embody value
judgments that affect the choice of goals; they can
also connect a coalition of decision makers with
sources of support that increase its power and
thereby affect the firm’s decisions (Thornton et al.,
2012). After describing the empirical context and
discussing in some depth institutional logics, we
introduce our outcome variable—namely, mergers
and acquisitions (M&As). That outcomewas often in
dispute because the decision not only was strategi-
cally important for the firm, but it also involved
weighing societal against managerial goals. We then
develop several hypotheses about the effect of co-
alition power on M&A rates and about the evolution
of that effect during China’s transitional period. We
also predict how the stock market reacts differently
toM&Asby firmswith different types of predominant
coalitions. Our empirical analysis shows that in-
stitutional logics affectedM&A decisions through the
coalitions committed to each logic; those coalitions
exhibited a strong tendency to reflect either the ex-
ternal power of ownership or the internal power of
representation on the board of directors.
INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS ON COALITIONS
A central assumption underlying this work is
that the firm is neither completely independent nor
completely governed by external influences (e.g.,
institutions); rather, firms are viewed as making
choices in a complex environment that enables
multiple actions, each favored by some groups but
not others (Greenwood et al., 2011). The literature on
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institutional logics holds that multiple logics often
coexist—either in the form of an enduring accom-
modation or during the transition from an old to
a new logic (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Lounsbury,
2007; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Schneiberg &
Soule, 2005). Each logic focuses attention on certain
issues and solutions (Ocasio, 1997; Shipilov, Greve,
& Rowley, 2010; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), and the
coexistence of multiple logics leads to external
pressures on firms to choose actions that are con-
sistentwith one of them (Yiu et al., 2014). Firmsmust
often make strategic decisions about whether or not
to choose actions newly allowed by institutional
change (Oliver, 1991; Peng, 2003).
An environment featuring many possible actions—
as will be recommended by contesting logics—gives
organizational decision making a prominent position
in the theory, and if the logics in question make
conflicting claims then the decision making that
follows will be affected by the building and de-
ployment of coalitions (Cyert & March, 1963). It is
an essential insight of the power and coalition views
of organizational decision making that both exter-
nal and internal sources of power need to be con-
sidered (Wry et al., 2013). External sources of power
are important because the organization depends on
other actors for resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978);
internal sources of power are important because
external actors have more influence when their
views have internal backing (Hickson,Hinings, Lee,
Schneck, & Pennings, 1971). This theory is well
known, but it has not yet been extended to the case
of choices involving contesting institutional logics.
Our theoretical tasks are thus: (1) identifying the
coalition most committed to each logic; (2) assess-
ing their external power derived from supporters in
the organizational environment; and (3) assessing
their internal power within the key decision-
making groups (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
The existence of multiple institutional logics
affects coalition dynamics and decision making in
two ways. First, institutional logics incorporate
assumptions, values, and beliefs (Thornton &
Ocasio, 1999). This creates divergent views among
decision makers subscribing to different—if not
contradictory—goals and beliefs. As in any decision-
making process, arguments will be used to promote
the favored alternative; however, when pitted against
others subscribing to a different institutional logic,
such arguments will founder on the barrier that re-
sults from the conflicting assumptions and values
embodied in the respective logics. When persuasion
does not yield agreement, decision-making groups
will likely resort to the use of power when seeking to
resolve contested issues (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974).
Second, an institutional logic exists because there
are actors who share its assumptions and beliefs and
who promote actions that are consistent with it. The
powerful external actors backing institutional logics
include the state (Greenwood, Dı´az, Li, & Lorente,
2010) and investors (Durand & Jourdan, 2012;
Shipilov et al., 2010). Internal decision makers (e.g.,
managers and directors) who subscribe to an in-
stitutional logic can invoke the support of those ex-
ternal backers as a source of power. Such power
threats may be sufficient to settle a dispute, since
most actors prefer resolutions that reflect their goals
without triggering potentially harmful conflicts.
Thus, the mechanism can be pressure from an ex-
ternal power source, the invoking of that power
source by internal decision makers, or the actual use
of power. Yet the expected result is the same: greater
power backing an institutional logic makes actions
compatible with that logic more likely to occur.
In particular, wielding power takes the form of
assembling coalitions that include decision makers
favoring the same logic and others who can be con-
vinced (Emerson, 1962). The theory of decision-
making coalitions was developed by Cyert and
March (1963), who explain how the existence of
multiple goals implies that decisions are not contests
between fixed groupings (as in, for example, the case
of contesting political parties). Instead, decisions in
such circumstances involve alternatives that differ
along several dimensions; in this case, then, co-
alitions can be formed by uniting decision makers
who agree on a given alternative. Thus a key feature
of the coalition perspective on decision making is
its reluctance to assume that the parties responsible
for the decision are clearly divided into opposing
camps. Rather, each coalition is viewed as attempt-
ing to increase its influence by allying with a greater
number of decision makers over a specific issue.
Many decisions are so complex that somedecision
makers favor one side and some the other even as
some decision makers are sympathetic to both sides
and others are uncommitted. Decision makers com-
mitted to a logic try to influence uncommitted and
ambivalent members with their persuasion and ar-
guments. This strategy is required because those
committed to a specific logic—or, more specifically,
to action(s) endorsed by that logic—do not always
constitute the majority of a decision-making group
and hence must gain allies in order to achieve their
favored outcome (Emerson, 1962). Neutral or am-
bivalent decision makers are inclined to adopt the
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viewmost commonlyheldby thosewhohave chosen
a side (Hastie & Kameda, 2005; Kuran & Sunstein,
1999; Mackie, 1986); this dynamic results in the
chosen alternative being one that is favored by a large
(though possibly still minority) coalition (Zhu,
2013). Thus, a greater commitment to a particular
institutional logic by external sources of power or by
internal decision-making parties should lead to
a greater likelihood that the actions it advocateswill
be adopted.
Although the link between firm coalitions and
institutional logics has not been emphasized in the
literature, there is empirical work that has estab-
lished some relevant findings. In the spreading new
institutional logic of corporate board reform—which
contested the older institutional logic of managerial
control over the board—key drivers were firm own-
ership by reform-promoting investors affiliated with
the organization and past adoption elsewhere of
board reform practices (Shipilov et al., 2010). In the
spread of a market finance logic in the French film
industry, greater ownership of films by investment
funds increased behaviors consistent with that logic
(Durand & Jourdan, 2012). In transitional China,
state-induced firm founding and state ownership
hindered the adoption of strategic entrepreneurship
in business groups (Yiu et al., 2014). This research
suggests that institutional logics are most likely to
penetrate a firm when they are backed by external
power sources, such as ownership. Yet it is impor-
tant to examine also the internal power sources that
stem from the building of coalitions and increased
representation in decision-making groups. There is
evidence that a board structure consistent with the
institutional logic of shareholder value ismore likely
to be adopted if the firm’s board of directors favors
this structure (Joseph, Ocasio, & McDonnell, 2014);
similarly, a bank is more likely to follow the com-
munity banking logic if it is well represented in their
founding team (Almandoz, 2014). In short, the ex-
ternal power of ownership and the internal power of
board representation are both critical to any viable
study of institutional logic penetration.
The specific decision outcome that we examine is
M&As, which are seldom analyzed as a contest of
institutional logics. The reason is that research on
M&As typically examines market-based economies,
where M&A activity is already viewed as being le-
gitimate behavior—though less so in some industries
than others (Thornton, 1995). Scholars have identi-
fied several drivers of M&As: economic motives
(Montgomery, 1994; Teece, 1982), such as efficiently
deploying resources (Anand & Singh, 1997; Capron,
Dussauge, &Mitchell, 1998), or creating high returns
(Capron & Pistre, 2002); and managers seeking to
reduce their own employment risk (Amihud & Lev,
1981; Lane, Cannella, & Lubatkin, 1998). Exactly
because M&As are economically crucial for firms,
they are well suited to being analyzed as the conse-
quence of coalition building and power use in de-
cision making (e.g., Goranova, Dharwadkar, &
Brandes, 2010). In the next section, we introduce
the institutional logics of our study context, after
which we develop theory-based hypotheses.
COMPETING LOGICS IN TRANSITIONAL CHINA
Since the 1980s, market reforms in China have
changed the prevailing economic logic from state
socialism—with societal goals pursued via state
control and redistribution of resources—to market
capitalism based on openmarkets and profit-seeking
corporations (Nee, 1992; Peng &Heath, 1996). One of
the principal reforms was reducing government
control of the market through privatization of SOEs
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Gupta, 2005), allow-
ing the formation of partially-privatized firms and
the entry of many private firms with no state
involvement (Garcı´a-Canal & Guille´n, 2008;
Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000). Although
state ownership remains (Peng, 2003), the state has
been transformed from sole owner to one share-
holder among others in publicly-listed firms; none-
theless, the state retains substantial shareholdings
and control (Fan,Wong, & Zhang, 2007; Peng, 2004).
At the same time, rapid growth of the private sector
and the increasing sophistication of such institutions
as the stock market have spawned diverse ownership
structures and organizational forms that are hosts to
multiple institutional logics and power sources.
Despite the country’s leadership seeking to lever-
age market mechanisms for purposes of economic
development, the institutional logic of state social-
ism persists in part of the state. The state socialism
logic is based on a redistributive economy (Szelenyi,
1978) whereby goods and services are channeled
through firms to the state, which allocates resources
back to firms and distributes output to consumers in
line with its political and social objectives (Park, Li,
& Tse, 2006). Under this logic, firms respond to
central decisions made by government at the local,
provincial, regional, and national levels. Firms are
tasked with fulfilling government plans (Zhou, Tse,
&Li, 2006),meetingproductionquotas in response to
demand, and ensuring that the employment rate
does not decline (Park & Ungson, 2001; Shleifer,
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1998). So under state socialism, firms’ strategic de-
cisions are far from independent and are focused
neither on profitability (Peng & Delios, 2006), in-
novation (Shleifer, 1998), nor competition (Shinkle
& Kriauciunas, 2012); firm strategy instead reflects
central planning and political connections (Shinkle
& Kriauciunas, 2010). Even though this logic con-
tradicts both the global trend toward a market
orientation in emerging economies andChina’s post-
1990 avowed goal of using market forces to
strengthen its economy, there remain state actors
who believe that state control and authority over
firms are still necessary.
In contrast, the institutional logic of market capi-
talism regards firms as profit-maximizing entities
that strive for economic efficiency through market
exchange and competition. The firm is perceived as
a bundle of assets whose true value is evaluated by
the cash flows provided to shareholders—rather
than by how much output it produces or how many
workers it employs (Fligstein, 1990). Private owner-
ship, property rights, and effective capital allocation
are highly valued and protected. Shareholder in-
terests are served by an established corporate gov-
ernance and management system that has priority
over the interests of other stakeholders (Davis &
Stout, 1992). Under this logic, firms are entitled to
make their own strategic choices and engage in
market-based, arm’s-length transactions (North,
1990; Peng, 2003). As compared with the case of
state control, capitalist firms have more flexibility in
dealing with demand and supply, are more
empowered to search formarket opportunities (Zhou
et al., 2006), are far more likely to engage in entre-
preneurial and innovative activities (Yiu et al.,
2014), and make choices that are driven by market
considerations (Peng & Heath, 1996).
Firms in China were initially dominated by state
ownership (Hoskisson et al., 2000) as in state shares
owned by central or provincial governments. These
actors typically exercised power through the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission (SASAC).1 The market transition led
most firms to become partially privatized by offering
so-called legal-person shares to private companies
and (non-bank) financial institutions. During this
transition, private firms entered the Chinese enter-
prise system in response to market capitalism’s in-
creasing prevalence in the state and in other firms.
With the further refinement of financial institutions,
both partially-privatized SOEs and private compa-
nies were allowed to be publicly listed on the stock
market and to offer ordinary widely distributed
shares to the general investment public. Because of
differences in firm founding and privatization, listed
firms can have either mixed state and private own-
ership or exclusive private ownership. The transi-
tion from the state socialism to themarket capitalism
institutional logic resulted in this duality of corpo-
rate governance, which needed to accommodate
multiple coalitions that favored competing logics
within the same firm and that contested for influence
over firm decisions.
Firm ownership is a key source of power for each
coalition advocating a contested institutional logic
(Emerson, 1962; Xia, Ma, Lu, & Yiu, 2014). There are
three main types of ownership: (1) state shares; (2)
legal-person shares; and (3) ordinary shares. State
shares are a remnant of the old state socialism logic
and are controlled by entities and individuals less
committed to market capitalism than are holders
of the other two share types. That being said, one
should not equate coalitions backing the state so-
cialism logic with the state itself. This is because the
state is not, in practice, a unified actor; it has plural
and contradictory structures of authority with het-
erogeneous agencies and goals and hence the po-
tential for internal conflict (Schneiberg & Bartley,
2001; Scott & Meyer, 1983). The state seeks both ef-
ficiencyachievedviamarket action and the retention
of state control, and different state actors prioritize
these goals differently.
So on the one hand, the state employs market-
based mechanisms to drive economic efficiency.
Proponents of this logic initiate the shift in that di-
rection while encouraging private investors to inject
investment capital and to employ their financial and
management expertise in the service of improving
firm performance. On the other hand, the state re-
tains its socialism logic of maintaining state control
over the private sector. Proponents of this logic be-
lieve that firms should contribute to social welfare
and should alsomaintain the balance of demand and
supply in their respective industries. A coalition
committed to these ideaswill naturally seek to retain
some control over firm decisions. Thus the state
1 Since May 2003, state shares have been held by
SASAC; this commission comprises several government
agencies that mimic the Chinese administrative govern-
ment’s hierarchical structure across central, provincial,
and local levels. SASAC was charged with establishing
a “new state asset management system in which authority,
duty, and responsibilities are united, and in which man-
agement of assets, personnel, and affairs is unified”
(SASAC, 2006).
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sector includes a coalition committed to state control
and inclined to use the state shares for getting in-
fluence on firm decisions; it also includes a coalition
committed to the logic of markets that promotes this
viewpoint by allowing non-state shareholders, such
as legal-person shareholders, to have an increased
say in firm decisions by gaining share ownership.
Hence higher remaining levels of state ownership
indicate a more persistent state socialism insti-
tutional logic still existing in the firmwhereas a high
level of legal person ownership reflects greater ac-
ceptance of the market capitalism logic.
The depth of the market capitalism logic’s pene-
tration and the power of its proponent coalition are
reflected by the firm’s number of legal-person shares
outstanding. These shares are owned by a limited set
of private-sector actors—typically large block
holders with a long-term strategic interest in the
firm. These shareholders are committed to the
market logic and are effective at monitoring firms
and managerial activities; they can also coordinate
to exert pressure. Legal persons are similar to the
listed firms of more developed economies in how
they are formed, governed, and managed (Delios &
Wu, 2005), and they are well known for aligning the
interests of management and shareholders while
improving the governance process (D’Souza,
Megginson, & Nash, 2005; Fan et al., 2007;
Gupta, 2005). Yet because it was the state that
created the possibility of legal-person share-
holding, the involvement of such entities in a firm’s
ownership structure reflects not only the support of
state socialismcoalitionactorswhoencouragemarket
solutions but also the external power of coalition ac-
tors committed entirely tomarket institutions. Unlike
the state, legal-person actors are not divided into two
coalitions pursuing their respective logics; instead,
their interests are fully aligned with the market logic.
Finally, the third type of ownership is that granted by
ordinary shares. Individuals who hold these shares
generally have a relatively short-term interest in firm
profitability; they are unable to pressure manage-
ment by coordinating their interests, which means
that they have the least power among all shareholder
types.
Our hypotheses focus on the power of well-
organized but opposing coalitions favoring either
state socialism ormarket capitalism; those coalitions
correspond to shares held by the state and by legal
persons and their respective representation in the
firm’s internal decision making. These two share-
holder groups can each be viewed as stakeholders
that seek firmdecisions in their favor.However, their
ability to do so depends not only on the power due to
ownership but also on their representation on the
board of directors and their ability to turn that rep-
resentation into the power to make decisions and
monitor the firm (Hill & Jones, 1992). Yet it is im-
portant to recognize that management and board
members who are not fully committed to either in-
stitutional logic also participate in the decision
making—a condition that leads actors to influence
decisions by building coalitions and using power
(Cyert & March, 1963; Hill & Jones, 1992; Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978).
Contesting institutional logics have particular
consequences for acquisitions. In the early stage of
China’s privatization process and stock market
building, most M&As were initiated by the govern-
ment and aimed at restructuring and enlarging the
affected firms (Gaur, Malhotra, & Zhu, 2013). Such
M&As were thus a form of coercive institutionaliza-
tion (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). M&As can be
equated with the combination of two administrative
units (firms) under state control; the goals of such
activity include shedding unproductive assets,
writing off debt, and gaining resources to strengthen
firms for the privatization to follow. These practices
were usually prescribed and supported by the state,
which most often selected and matched both the
acquirer and the target. Such state-initiated acquisi-
tions fulfilled the state’s objective of supervising the
market and reconfiguring asset control so that the
focal firms could thrive.
The Chinese stock market grew rapidly sub-
sequent to enactment (on 1 July 1999) of the Securi-
ties Law, which formalized the issuance, listing, and
trading of securities. The increasing influence of fi-
nancial institutions and private investors pressured
all listed firms to become more market oriented. As
a result, state-initiated M&As gradually became less
prominent among listed firms. Instead, market-
oriented M&As driven by increasing influence of
the market capitalism logic gained prominence and
became common among listed firms. M&As were
conducted both by listed partially-privatized SOEs
and by listed private firms. Thus M&As under the
market logic no longer represented a combination of
units controlled by the state; instead they were in-
stances of one firm seeking, as an independent actor,
to acquire another firm and thus eliminate it. For the
market capitalism coalition,M&As could be pursued
for potential economic benefits and to cement the
coalition power, as we will discuss later. During this
stage of the transition, state-initiated acquisitions
still occurred among listed firms owing to the
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persistence of state control. These state-initiated ac-
quisitions were excluded from our analysis because
our paper’s focus is on market-oriented M&As that
reflect strategic decisions by firms—not state-
initiatedM&As that reflect the state’s ownobjectives.
Market-oriented acquisitions are defined as acqui-
sitions initiated by the firm. Their targets were firms
believed to be capable of providing economic returns
to the acquirer, and hence they are not motivated by
state objectives, though they may still be done by
partially-privatized SOEs. Much as in the context of
a developed economy, these market-oriented M&As
could result in the target’s elimination as an in-
dependent firm and possibly in a reduction of em-
ployment (due to post-M&A integration) in both the
acquiringand the target firm.M&Ascouldalsochange
a firm’s competitive landscape, alter its operational
efficiency, facilitate or disrupt synergy, and increase
or decrease shareholder value—all depending on the
quality of the M&A decision and implementation
(Barney, 1988; Seth, 1990). The various possible out-
comes of a market-oriented M&A make it a strategic
and risky decision, so there can be a significant
struggle between coalitions holding different logics
and goals for the firm.
HYPOTHESES
The conflict in Chinese listed firms between de-
cision makers committed to the state socialism and
market capitalism logics triggers the use of power in
M&Adeliberations. Each coalition has its own goals,
external sources of support, and internal participa-
tion in the decision making. As discussed pre-
viously, the friction between these coalitions forces
decision makers to resolve conflicts through a com-
bination of influence and power.
Goals of the State Socialism Logic
Two core goals dominate the agenda of the state
socialism coalition, and both are integral to the cor-
responding institutional logic. The first goal is to
preserve social andmarket stability (Frye & Shleifer,
1997; Nee, 1992), even though pursuing this goal
may render the firm less profitable andmay result in
capital being used inefficiently (Wong, Opper, & Hu,
2004). The logic of socialism dictates that political
control and stability must be unchallenged and that
every individual economic gain must be weighed
against the cost to other constituencies. The state
socialism coalition cares mainly about political
control of the country’s economic lifelines. This goal
is most prominent in strategic industries, which in-
clude the military, petroleum, telecommunications,
and the construction of infrastructure; in these in-
dustries, the state socialism coalition typically re-
tains formal ownership control and has the potential
to strongly influence firm strategy (Du, Tang, &
Young, 2012; Lenway & Murtha, 1994). Coalitions
favoring state socialism also make sacrifices in effi-
ciency to promote social welfare. For example, they
pressure firms to maintain employment levels even
if itmeans keeping redundantworkers on the payroll
(Boubakri, Cosset, & Saffar, 2008; Eden & Lenway,
2001; Scott, 2002; Walder, 1995). Proponents of the
state socialism logicwould rather executeM&As that
are planned and administered by the state (Wang,
2014) than evaluate acquisition opportunities in the
market, partly because of concerns about the possi-
ble negative effects of market-oriented M&As on lo-
cal employment, on product market instability, and
on the balance of relationships among major firms
operating in related public and private sectors.2
These concerns will lower the frequency of market-
oriented M&As by firms with a higher level of state
ownership, since those firms generally exhibit strong
support for the institutional logic of state socialism.
The second core goal of a state socialism coalition
is for the firm to contribute to increased gross do-
mestic product (GDP) and thereby redistribute
wealth for the benefit of the state’s social welfare.
As a corporate investment, M&As require strategic
planning, evaluation of fit, risk assessment, deal ex-
ecution, and integration. Yet coalitions that favor the
state socialism logic seldom have much expertise in
modern management theories or practice. So unless
the state handles the matchmaking, it is difficult for
that coalition to search for opportunities and to
identify acquisition targets likely to increase reve-
nue; this limitation discourages them from engaging
in M&As that are not state initiated (Wang, 2014).
The problems that M&As can create with respect to
political and societal goals—when combined with
a lack of experience in choosing market-oriented
acquisition targets—make decision makers that sub-
scribe to the state socialism logic skeptical of market-
orientedM&Asand less inclined to searchactively for
equity market opportunities or to consider them as
strategic priorities. This reluctance does not entail an
utter abandonment of market-oriented M&As, espe-
cially as such activity becomes a more accepted be-
havior (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), but decision
2 Recall that we omit state-initiatedM&As from our data
because they are not reflective of firm decision-making.
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makers favoring the state socialism logic are much
less likely to pursue such strategies.
Power of a State Socialism Coalition
An important aspect of a firm’s decision making is
that the group favoring a particular alternative will
seek to build a coalition with other decision makers
in order to extend the base of those subscribing to
their views (Emerson, 1962; Xia et al., 2014). The
power of a coalition favoring the state socialism logic
derives from the remaining state ownership of the
firm and the formal decision-making control that
such ownership grants (Xia et al., 2014). Firms with
high levels of state ownership are, as expected, more
likely to reflect the logic of state socialism because
their leadership includes individualswho are highly
committed to that institutional logic and are aware of
the power conferred by state ownership. For in-
stance, the SASAC has the right to direct the strategy
of affiliated firms and to approve major enterprise
decisions. A state-appointed director of a listed firm
with high state ownership put it this way:
We don’t just go and buy any firm. What if it doesn’t
workwell?Wehave 300,000 employees nationwide to
feed, a very heavy tax load, and nowwe are listed and
subject to public observation. We don’t want to spend
a load of money to carry a burden home unless it is
bridged by the government. That would be a different
story. I would say we are more conservative in the
equity market, because we have to be. [Translation of
an interview conducted by C.M. Zhang.]
This statementwell illustrates the values endorsed
by proponents of the state socialism logic. It is both
noteworthy and typical that this individual—a di-
rector of a firm owned in large part by the state—
described the firm’s view of M&As in a way that ac-
cords with the state socialism logic. We may specu-
late that the firm had other directors who subscribed
to the logic of market capitalism, individuals who
had different goals and who may well have been
frustrated by their inability to pursue them in this
environment. Even so, given state ownership as
a power source we predict that firms with greater
state ownership will be less likely to undertake
M&As that are motivated by market considerations.
Hypothesis 1a. The higher a firm’s proportion of
state ownership, the less likely it is to engage in
market-oriented M&As.
Ownership gives formal control rights over a firm,
but exercising those external rights requires internal
representation on the board of directors. The SASAC
can appoint state employees to the boards of di-
rectors in its affiliated firms, but current state em-
ployees are not the only board members who have
encountered or who advocate the state socialism
logic; board members with past experience working
for the state likewise allow the logic of state socialism
to influence their decision making. This dynamic is
complicated, however, by directors with state expe-
rience. Just as the state is beholden to conflicting
logics, so too can directors be who are either former
or current state employees. Previous research docu-
ments that even after leaving the state position, the
exposure to the same ideology as state actors has
a lingering effect on directors with state experience.
For instance, Du et al. (2012: 1561) quote a SASAC
official as follows: “Former governmental officials
think like governmental officials even after joining
boards of directors. They tend to approach questions
from a macro-economic perspective, and from the
industry-wideperspective. Theyunderstand towhat
extent the governmentwants to regulate the industry
and why.” Indeed, such personal attitude inertia is
well known from other contexts (Kuran, 1988).
A second complication is the presence of directors
with state experience in state-owned and private
firms both; it is certainly possible that directors with
state experience join the board of a listed private firm
and continue to advocate the institutional logic of
state socialism. These complications suggest that
directorswith state experience should not be viewed
as promoting the state socialism logic only in firms
with some degree of state ownership. After all, such
directors may vary in their adherence to state so-
cialism, and some may advocate applying it to the
decisions of firms with no state ownership. In any
event, it is probably safe to view directors with state
experience as being more influenced by the logic of
state socialism than other directors. Directors with
state experience are especially powerful when they
constitute a high proportion of the firm’s board
membership. Formally, we make the following
prediction.
Hypothesis 1b. The higher a firm’s proportion of
board members with state experience, the less
likely it is to engage in market-oriented M&As.
Goals of the Market Capitalism Logic
Two goals are essential to the market capitalism
logic and hence to the decision makers that are
committed to it. The first goal is value creation: firms
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engage in long-term investment plans, search for
alternative growth opportunities (Gaur et al., 2013),
overcome barriers to market entry (Chang &
Rosenzweig, 2001), seek to reduce the costs and
risks associated with product development, and use
M&A experiences to learn from other stakeholders.
Such goals are consistent with market-oriented
M&As, so these decision makers survey the market-
place for acquisition opportunities that could prove
advantageous to the firm (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986).
China’s transition period offered ample opportuni-
ties in the form of firmswith inefficient management
practices but attractive product portfolios—an en-
vironment in which M&As are a promising strategy.
Yet M&As are also risky, as documented in many
studies that examine the considerable variance (and
frequent decline) in post-merger performance
(Moeller, Schlingemann, &Stulz, 2005; Seth, Song, &
Pettit, 2002). A market capitalism coalition will ad-
vocate for market-oriented acquisitions whenever
the opportunities seem to outweigh the risks.
The second goal of market capitalism is to exploit
favorable momentum (Amburgey & Miner, 1992).
Each M&A moves the firm toward an organizational
structure that better fits the expertise of individuals
subscribing to the market capitalism logic, thereby
committing the firm to market capitalism via “con-
textual momentum” as subsequent M&As allow the
firm to build on the experience gained from such
activity (Amburgey&Miner, 1992; Haleblian, Kim, &
Rajagopalan, 2006). A series of M&As will tend to
increase the state coalition’s dependence on the
market coalition’s financial and managerial exper-
tise, which increases the latter’s leverage in future
power struggles with the former (Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978; Xia et al., 2014). Following anM&A, managers
committed to themarket capitalism logic tend to take
leading roles in post-acquisition integration, and
their resulting increased authority strengthens their
influence on firm decisions and accelerates the
firm’s adoption ofmarket capitalism as its preferred
institutional logic. One board member representing
legal person ownership in a partially-privatized
SOE suggested that a prior market-oriented M&A
had this effect, stating that “after themerger our firm
has become more attractive for further financing
and more impactful in the industry. The SASAC
people on the board were also pleased by the suc-
cess and offered a lot more discretion for our post-
merger integration. The SASAC and our regional
government would be happy to leave all the details
to us without worrying about decline in GDP con-
tribution by the firm.”
Power of a Market Capitalism Coalition
The power backing themarket capitalism logic also
derives from formal ownership rights and board rep-
resentation, but caremust be takenwhenassessing the
power of that institutional logic. Any owners (other
than official state actors) could be committed to mar-
ket capitalism, so this power could simply be the in-
verse of state ownership power. However, a more
accurate view is that the non-state owners are of two
distinct types. One group consists of small-fraction
and short-term shareholders (e.g., individual in-
vestors), whose capacity to affect firm decisions is—
just as in the United States and other developed
economies—extremely limited. The other group of
non-stateownersconsistsofdomestic institutions that
own legal-person shares; it is these shareholders that
are themain source of power formanagers committed
to the market capitalism logic. Legal-person share-
holders (e.g., private industrial firms and investment
funds) are committed advocates of the market capi-
talism logic. They search for value creation opportu-
nities, even risky ones, and have the expertise to
manage a post-merger organization. They also hold
significant share positions and can coordinate to in-
fluence the firm,whichmakes themfarmorepowerful
than individual investors. M&As are clearly compat-
ible with the goals of coalitions committed to the
market capitalism logic, and their backing by legal
persons increases their power. Thus we predict:
Hypothesis 2a. The higher a firm’s proportion of
legal-person ownership, the more likely it is to
engage in market-oriented M&As.
The representation of market capitalism on a firm’s
board of directors serves as that coalition’s internal
source of power and influences M&A decisions. The
market capitalism coalition can leverage its financial
and managerial knowledge to frame each M&A pro-
posal in terms that make it more acceptable to other
board members. When recruiting board members
who might be sympathetic to market capitalism, its
advocates may present evidence that is strongly
suggestive of possible synergies between the ac-
quiring and the target firm and hence of the potential
profits arising from an acquisition. The market cap-
italism coalition’s managerial expertise and in-
tentions to increase firm profitability need not
determine the eventual outcome, but their advocacy
might still persuade neutral or ambivalent board
members or even some members of the state social-
ism coalition in the case of a particular M&A
proposal—as when, for example, the acquisition
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could be justified in terms of preserving jobs or in-
creasing employment. Thus the likelihood of a fa-
vorable M&A decision depends both on the board’s
composition and on specific characteristics of the
decision that affect the ease of recruiting additional
board members to one coalition or the other.
The most secure signal of market capitalism being
favored by board members is the proportion of them
holding shares in the firm. We use this proportion to
assess both the size and relative power of the co-
alition supporting the institutional logic of market
capitalism. Stock market participation indicates ac-
ceptance of the market capitalism logic, and owning
the focal firm gives long-term alignment of the board
member interests with the interests of the firm as
amarket capitalismparticipant.Althoughshareholding
boardmembersmaynot be the only oneswho advocate
the logic of market capitalism, they will be its most re-
liable supporters. We make the following prediction:
Hypothesis 2b. The higher a firm’s proportion of
board members who own stock in the firm, the
more likely it is to engage in market-oriented
M&As.
Power Shifts over Time
In late twentieth-century China, the power of both
institutional logics changed over time as market
capitalism became more accepted and more in-
grained in the national economy (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983). At the macro level, transitioning to-
ward amarket economy enabled a wider diffusion of
the market capitalism logic, which was also facili-
tated by the refinement of such market features as
shareholder protection laws and various corporate
governance reforms. At the micro level, the growing
number of market-oriented M&As had the effect of
legitimizing that strategy for listed firms (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983) and, in turn, increasing the influence
of market capitalism coalitions on firm decision
making. The increasing frequency of such activities
as market-oriented M&As also created more oppor-
tunities for market capitalism coalitions to employ
their financial andmanagerial expertise. At the same
time, the state socialism coalition’s way of thinking
became less in tune with the market transition’s
general trends, eroding the power of firm directors
who clung to that logic. An official of the SASAC
whom we interviewed noted that “the policy by the
state council and the SASAC is putting more em-
phasis on relying on the growth of private enterprises
to transform low efficiency industries, even at the
expense of some underperforming SOEs”; this state-
ment indicates that the state socialism coalition was
receiving less state support than before. Another fac-
tor reducing the state socialism coalition’s influence
on firm decisions was its reliance on the market cap-
italism coalition’s expertise, which was required to
manage the more complex organizations resulting
fromM&As and a developing equity market. So even
as political and societal concerns still motivated state
socialism coalitions to delay the ongoing shift
to market capitalism, their ability to do so was
diminished—as reflected in the ever increasing
number of market-oriented M&As. These consid-
erations lead to our next two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3. The negative effect of a state so-
cialism coalition’s power on the likelihood of
market-oriented M&As decreases over time.
Hypothesis 4. The positive effect of a market
capitalism coalition’s power on the likelihoodof
market-oriented M&As increases over time.
Investor Reactions to Mergers and Acquisitions
Given the effects on M&A activity of institutional
logics and coalition power that we have described,
one might well suppose that ownership shares also
affect investor reactions to such activity. The logic is
as follows. Stock market returns represent the mar-
ket’s assessment of changes in firm value, so they
also reflect whether investors believe that a firm’s
actions are beneficial (i.e., value-generating). These
evaluations are not the same as long-term perfor-
mance of M&As (e.g., King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin,
2004); more specifically, the former reflect investor
assessments of each M&A decision. Shares of own-
ership are seen by investors as signals (albeit indirect
ones) of management quality and the true intent of
a strategic action (Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002). State
ownership empowers coalitions committed to the
state socialism logic, which is relatively uncon-
cerned about economic efficiency. To the extent that
such coalitions engage inM&As, they are likely to be
perceived as following the state socialism practice of
encouraging larger firms to take over smaller and/or
troubled firms so as to maintain employment levels
in areas where the former workers of failed firms
wouldhave difficulty finding new jobs—or of simply
combining government matched firms with no
efficiency promise. That M&A activity could be
motivated by political or social objectives leads
investors to suspect that those objectives may be
fulfilled at the expense of other shareholders’
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interests (Bai, Liu, Lu, Song, & Zhang, 2004;
Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000). Indeed, tra-
ditional state practices are such that investors may
believe theM&As pursued by a firmwith substantial
state ownership to be ill advised even when they are
not; such skepticism, however well founded, would
be detrimental to post-acquisition outcomes. This
leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. The proportion of state ownership
is negatively related to the firm’s cumulative
abnormal return following its announcement of
a market-oriented M&A.
Legal-person ownership is a source of power for
coalitions committed to the market capitalism logic
and motivated to give the firm discretion in making
acquisitions. Such coalitions are also motivated to in-
crease the firm’s returns and so will select acquisition
targets that offer the potential to achieve that goal;
promising firms may be in industries with growth po-
tential, may be a good fit for the firm, and/or might be
easy to turn around financially (e.g., Gaur et al., 2013).
To the extent that aboardwith a strongmarket-oriented
coalition makes decisions of which investors approve,
itsM&Ashavethepotential togenerateshort-termgains
in stock value. Yet even in such mature market econo-
miesas theUnitedStates, thestockmarket’s response to
acquisitions is often negative because of the uncertain
consequences of M&As for firm value (Kaplan &
Weisbach, 1992; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990).
How a stock market will react to the announcement of
a market-oriented M&A in a context like China is thus
an open empirical question, so we do not formulate
a hypothesis, but we do include a variable for legal-
person ownership in the analysis of investor reactions.
Nor do we formulate hypotheses for board member
proportions,which are less knownand thus unlikely to
have any effect (as confirmed in preliminary analysis).
METHODOLOGY
Data Sources
Our main sources of data were the China Stock
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database
and the WIND database. The former is developed by
Guo Tai An Information Technology (GTA) in col-
laboration with the University of Hong Kong and the
China Accounting and Finance Research Center of
Hong Kong Polytechnic University; this database
covers theownership,boardofdirectors, and financial
data of all listed firms in China since 1992. It has been
widely used in finance and economics research
(Li, Moshirian, Nguyen, & Tan, 2007; Lin & Su, 2008;
Rousseau & Xiao, 2008). The WIND database is pro-
duced by WIND Information and provides detailed
information on firm M&As, including the date of
announcement, the acquisition target, and the nature
of the acquisition (asset, equity, or both). Accounting
information in theWIND database is similar to that in
theCSMARdatabase,whichenabledus tocross-check
and patch our data for completeness. We merged the
WIND database on acquisition announcements with
one-year–lagged CSMAR ownership data, board data,
and fiscal year performance data. The resulting data
set included everyM&Aduring the 2000–2012 period
by nearly all listed Chinese firms across 84 3-digit in-
dustries as categorized by the China Securities and
Regulatory Commission (CSRC). This time period is
widely regarded as marking a new stage in the devel-
opment of the Chinese stock market, a span during
which that stockmarket andprivate sector began to be
seen as integral to the economy (Jiang, Yue, & Zhao,
2009). During this period, firms’M&A decisions were
affected both by state socialism coalitions and market
capitalism coalitions.
To gain a better understanding of the divergent
rationales behind these competing institutional
logics, we conducted eight interviews with key
insiders—namely, government officials at SASAC
(representing state ownership) and senior managers
in two prominent listed firms (representing legal-
person ownership). In addition, we visited the web-
sites of a random sample of 150 listed firms and
reviewed press articles reporting on M&As (e.g., in
the China Economic Times) to draw inferences
concerning their principal economic activities.
These qualitative data provided more detail about
internal decision-making processes.
Estimation Method and Dependent Variables
We analyzed the rate of mergers and acquisitions
and the merged entities’ cumulative abnormal
returns post-acquisition. The data allowed for a con-
tinuous-time event history analysis because they
included the exact announcement date of eachM&A
event. Our research question focuses on the decision
to undertake M&As, so we coded the announcement
of one or multiple M&As at one time as an event
irrespective of whether the announced acquisition
was completed (95% of them were). The dependent
variable was defined as deals that WIND classified
as mergers or acquisitions through obtaining
a controlling stake of more than 50% equity owner-
ship (WIND also contains data on the acquisition of
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minority shares). To restrict our sample tomarket-
oriented transactions, we excluded announce-
ments of M&As initiated and administered by the
state. After missing data deletions, the sample
consisted of 2,337 firms and 24,151 observations
after splitting spells annually to update covariates.
The data have 1,551 days onwhich a firm announced
at least one M&A. Because acquisitions tend to
occur in waves, we employed the flexible Cox
proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972), which
improves estimates of the effects of observed
covariates. The formula for the hazard rate h(t) in
the Cox model is the product of a time-dependent
term that is fit to the data, hi (t), and a regression
function for the covariates:
hðtÞ5hiðtÞexp½bXt2 1:
Using the event study methodology (e.g., King &
Soule, 2007; Zajac & Westphal, 2004), for each M&A
announcement we computed the cumulative abnor-
mal return (CAR)usingvarious timewindowsaround
the announcement day and ran linear regressions to
assess the effect of different levels of state and legal-
person ownership on the CAR. To avoid spurious
effects of events that were not the object of our study,
weusedshort eventwindows: [21, 1], [21, 2], [21, 5],
[0, 1], and [0, 2]; here the first and second number in
each pair are, respectively, thewindow’s starting and
endingday relative to the event (announcement) day,
which is day 0. Differences in themarket reaction (as
proxied by CAR) that are explained by ownership
type constitute evidence that the market evaluates
firms’ future prospects as a function of that owner-
ship. The CAR for each firm in the event window [t1,
t2] around its M&A announcement q are calculated
using the CAPM method, which accounts for the
market movement as well as the focal stock’s move-
ment relative to the market—that is, its b coefficient
(e.g., King & Soule, 2007).
Independent Variables
Ownership. To test our hypotheses about the ex-
ternal power of each coalition, we calculated the
proportions of their shares. In order to capture the
influence of coalitions committed to the state so-
cialism logic, we summed the shares owned by
government agencies and those ownedby large SOEs
to obtain state shares.We categorize any state-owned
shareholder as part of a coalition that advocates the
logic of state socialism. To identify shareholders that
are part of a coalition advocating the logic of market
capitalism, we summed the shares owned by private
legal persons—that is, private-sector firms, non-bank
financial institutions, and investment funds.
Board composition. We calculated the propor-
tions of board members who had experience in state
positions and who had ownership of shares in the
focal firm. The proportion of directors with state
experience was found via electronic search of board
member re´sume´ data from CSMAR, which indicated
the agency at which the individual in question
worked previously (or currently). We denoted an in-
dicator for whether or not the individual had worked
for the state in any capacity, since that definition best
reflects our theoretical argument. The sum of these
indicators is divided by the number of boardmembers
to yield the proportion of directors with state experi-
ence in each firm, which is the variable we use in the
regressions.Thevariable for theproportionofdirectors
owning stock is also based on CSMAR data and is
calculated as the sum of indicators for whether or not
an individual director holds any stock in the firm di-
vided by the number of board members. The pro-
portion of actual shares owned was also available and
was tested in preliminary runs, but the results were no
different than when we simply used the proportion of
directors owning any shares.
Control variables. We controlled for industry ef-
fects and region effects by including indicator vari-
ables for 84 industries (at the 3-digit level) and 31
provinces. We also controlled for the age of the firm
because older firms might have less need for M&As.
A firm’s size can affectM&A decisions (Montgomery,
1994) as well as risk-taking behavior more generally
(Audia & Greve, 2006), so we controlled for (the log-
arithm of) a firm’s total assets. In addition, we con-
sidered the effect of a firm’s growth opportunities on
M&As by controlling for its market-to-book ratio. We
included debt-to-equity ratios to capture the effect (if
any) of a firm’s financial leverage on M&A decisions.
Prior acquisition experience is positively related to
the likelihood of subsequent acquisitions (Haleblian
et al., 2006), so regressions incorporate the cumula-
tive number of M&As by each firm. To control for the
possibility that excess resources may drive firms to
make inefficient investments (Iyer &Miller, 2008),we
used Haleblian and Finkelstein’s (1999) measure for
the percentage of free cash flow. We included the
firm’s level of diversification—operationalized
as the count of industries in which the firm
engages—because diversification may affect the
frequency of its M&As. We also included the pro-
portion of foreign ownership in order to control
for any effects of foreign owners on M&As. Finally,
we created an indicator variable for whether or not
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the firm had been cited by the CSRC for financial
statementmisconduct within the past year; this was
to control for effects of (detected) accounting mis-
conduct on the ability to undertake M&As.
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics and correlations are reported
in Table 1, which reveals that some correlations are
high, but not enough to cause estimation problems.
We also calculated variance inflation factors and
found the highest to be 2.2, well below the value of
10 used to diagnose multicollinearity. Table 2 and
Table 3 present the results of Cox models examining
the possible drivers of M&A decisions. The testing is
performed in stages. We first enter the ownership
variables for Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 2a and
the board variables for Hypothesis 1b and Hypothe-
sis 2b separately before estimating a model with all
these effects entered jointly. We also examine in-
teractions between ownership and board member-
ship. After completing these tests, we then check for
whether the effects differ by time period; we let the
last year of the “early” time period vary from 2006 to
2008, during which China experienced a significant
increase in M&As (from 57 in 2007 to 182 in 2008).
This test exploreswhether the increasing dominance
of market capitalism in the “later” time period af-
fected power dynamics such that its advocates
gained power while the advocates of state socialism
lost power (e.g., Thornton, 2001).
Model 1 of Table 2 includes only the control var-
iables, and Model 2 tests Hypothesis 1a and Hy-
pothesis 2a. Hypothesis 1a is supported by the
negative and significant effect of state ownership on
the M&A rate. Higher state ownership reduces
market-orientedM&Aactivity, aswouldbepreferred
by a state-oriented coalition. Hypothesis 2a is sup-
ported by the positive and significant coefficient of
legal-person ownership, confirming that the ex-
pected greater support of market-oriented coalitions
increases M&A activity. Model 3 replaces the own-
ership variables with board variables to test Hy-
pothesis 1b and Hypothesis 2b. The results are
consistent with Model 2 and in line with our theory.
A greater proportion of directors with state experi-
ence significantly reduces the M&A rate, while
a greater proportion of directors owning stock sig-
nificantly increases the M&A rate. Thus, all the var-
iants of Hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported.
The regression results reported in Model 4 include
all four variables forHypotheses 1a/b andHypotheses
2a/b simultaneously. This is a strict test because
boards normally reflect the composition of owner-
ship and thus should have less (or perhaps no) effect
if owners fully exercise their formalpower. In fact, all
variables continue to yield significant effects, which
supports our claim that decisions are influenced by
both external and internal sources of power. Neither
owner nor board effects are much reduced when the
other is added to themodel (note that the coefficients
of hazard rate models can be compared directly
across specifications). Moreover, the magnitude of
these effects are fairly similar across these four var-
iables (here the coefficients are comparable because
all variables are scaled as fractions). In short, these
results indicate that the external power of owners
and the internal power of decision makers jointly
determine strategic decisions. Models 5, 6, and 7 are
robustness checks and will be discussed later.
Wealsoexplorewhether thepowerof coalitions—as
proxied by our variables for ownership and board
membership—varies during the time period under
study. In Table 3, Model 2 reports the results of an
analysis inwhich the last year of the “early” period is
set to 2007. That time split is arguably the most ap-
propriate for our purposes because 2007 saw an in-
crease inM&A activity but not to the stable high level
of subsequent years.Weremark that this specification
doubles the number of coefficients to be estimated,
which reduces the statistical power not only of each
coefficient’s estimate but also of the tests used to as-
certain whether those estimated coefficients differ
significantly from each other. This works against the
hypothesis that these effects change over time.
Nevertheless, the implications of our estimates are
quite clear. Board members who support the state
socialism logic do not lose power over time, yet those
supporting themarket capitalism logic do gain power
over time. This outcome is best seen by examining the
x2 tests of whether the coefficients for early- and late-
period estimates differ significantly from each other.
We conclude that Hypothesis 3 is not supported but
that Hypothesis 4 is supported. These findings are of
interest because they confirm that firms are indeed
converting to the market capitalism logic—a re-
flection of the external pressures to do so—even as
coalitions that adhere to the logic of state socialism
remain capable of delaying that transition. To test the
robustness of this conclusion, in Table 3 we use a dif-
ferent cutoff year forModels1, 2, and3.The results are
remarkably consistent across these specifications.
The effects of our control variables are strongly
similar in all the regressions reported in Table 2
(and in Table 3, though not displayed). Firm age is
negatively related to the likelihood of M&As. This
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result is expected given that, the longer it has been
since a firmwas founded, themore likely it is to have
inherited a strong state socialism tradition; which
inhibits firms from engaging in M&As. This negative
correlation is consistent also with the state-oriented
logicbehindHypothesis1, thoughwedonot consider
firm age as a test of that hypothesis because age is
related to so many other firm characteristics. That
firm size increases the probability of M&As has been
documented inprevious empirical research (e.g., Iyer
& Miller, 2008) and is confirmed by our analysis.
Prior research underscores how experience with ac-
quisitions provides firms with opportunities for
learning and accumulating knowledge on how best
to select an M&A target (Haleblian & Finkelstein,
1999; Zollo & Singh, 2004) and to restructure the
firm post-acquisition (Capron & Guillen, 2009), and
experience that reinforces the firm’s routines for en-
gaging in M&As. There is a positive relation between
firms’ market-to-book ratios and their frequency of
M&A activity, which suggests that M&As are driven
more by the availability of promising opportunities
than by the presence of enterprise problems.
Our dataset includes additional variables that can
be used in further explorations of how, over time, the
institutional logics of state socialism and market
capitalism gained support within firms. First, in-
dividuals acquire state experience through different
state agencies,which are connected to firms in varying
degrees. Testing with agency-level variables revealed
that none had greater explanatory power than that of
our variable for any kind of state experience. Second,
directors could have state experience at either the
central (national) or the provincial level, a distinction
TABLE 3
Cox Model of Mergers and Acquisitionsa
Time Split Models
Last Year in Early Period Model 1 2006 Model 2 2007 Model 3 2008
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes
Same controls as in Table 2
Early state ownership 20.587 20.891** 21.056**
(0.393) (0.330) (0.268)
Late state ownership 20.371* 20.401* 20.343
(0.180) (0.191) (0.214)
–x2 test of difference 0.26 1.72 4.55*
Early legal-person ownership 20.067 20.540 20.598*
(0.434) (0.364) (0.289)
Late legal-person ownership 0.533** 0.658** 0.783**
(0.149) (0.151) (0.157)
–x2 test of difference 1.74 9.40** 18.02**
Early proportion of directors with state experience 20.457 20.304 20.093
(0.417) (0.302) (0.227)
Late proportion of directors with state experience 20.407** 20.416** 20.545**
(0.137) (0.143) (0.156)
–x2 test of difference 0.01 0.12 2.811
Early proportion of directors owning stock 20.093 20.174 20.158
(0.227) (0.212) (0.191)
Late proportion of directors owning stock 0.598** 0.675** 0.778**
(0.156) (0.161) (0.173)
–x2 test of difference 6.37* 10.35** 13.57**
Likelihood ratio test x2 567.15** 578.12** 590.81**
Log-likelihood 211,057.51 211,052.03 211,045.69
Bayesian Information Criterion 23,376.52 23,365.56 23,373.06
a A total of 2,337 firms and 24,151 firm-year spells comprise the data. Robust standard errors grouped on firm are in parentheses.
1 p , 0.1
*p , 0.05
**p , 0.01; two-sided hypothesis tests.
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that could lead to different effects on attitudes toward
institutional logics. Indeed, provincial (as compared
with central) state experience was associated with
significantly greater hesitation to undertake M&As, as
should be expected in light of the central state’s initi-
ation and advocacy ofmarket-oriented reforms. Third,
an alternativemeasure of belief inmarket capitalism is
whether the focal board member attended a business
school. This variable was significantly related to in-
creased M&A activity, albeit less strongly than was
stock ownership—though part of that difference
is explained by such directors being less commonly
encountered than shareholding directors. The re-
sults based on these variables are all consistent with
the theory that we advance in this paper.
We performed three additional robustness checks
because a key sampling issue is identifying exactly
which firms and M&As to include. In our main
analysis we included all listed firms—that is, par-
tially privatized state-owned enterprises and also
private firms with no state ownership—because the
absence of state ownership does not prevent firms
from appointing directors with state experience and
so having a board with a state socialism coalition. In
Table 2, Model 5 checks for whether our conclu-
sions still hold when we omit SOEs controlled by
the central SASAC,3 since these firms are more
heavily supervised by the state than are other
partially-privatized SOEs; results for this smaller
sample are the same as for the full sample. Model 6
eliminates all SOEs and thus leaves only private
firms in the sample, yet all findings are again rep-
licated except that director stock ownership loses
significance (here the state ownership variable is
omitted because its value is 0 for all firms). Finally,
recall that the main analysis excluded all state-
initiated M&As to ensure that our hypotheses were
addressing strictly firm-level decisions. To see
whetherour theorizing remainedvalid for allM&As, in
Model 7we returned to our original sample of all listed
firms and changed the dependent variable so that it
included also those state-initiatedM&As.We find that
our hypotheses are fully supportedwith respect to this
sample as well. In sum, our findings are robust to
redefiningboth the sampleand themeasuredoutcome.
As a further robustness check, we tested the Cox
proportionality assumption and found that it is vio-
lated with regard to firm size and firm age. We there-
fore estimated a Cox model that was stratified by size
and age levels, and found that all hypotheses were
supported, and the proportionality assumption held.
In Table 4 we present the results from analyzing
the CAR of each stock around the time of each ac-
quisition announcement. For this analysis, a full re-
gression on the CAR associated with each window
was specified using the same control variables as in
Table 2. The reported values establish that a higher
proportionof state ownershiphas anegative effect on
CAR,which supportsHypothesis 5.However, higher
levels of legal-person ownership have no significant
effect onCAR. So even though investors are skeptical
of M&As by firms with high state ownership, there is
no (statistically significant) opposing effect of in-
vestors viewing M&As by firms with high legal-
person ownership positively. These results echo the
findings reported by scholars who examine market
economies, in which the market response to acqui-
sitions is highly variable and not generally positive.
That being said, the contrast we find between the
effects of state ownership and of legal-person own-
ership is consistent with our theory.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
How firms make strategic decisions is a central
question that has been answered in terms of both
environmental influences and internal characteris-
tics. In this paper, we examine that question by in-
vestigating M&As during a period in which they
became more common. We seek to explain firm de-
cisions by showing how contested institutional
logics were represented in the power structure of
firms, which enabled those logics to affect strategic
decisions. The evidence confirms our theoretical
expectations in revealing the coexistence of com-
peting logics—namely, state socialismversusmarket
capitalism—within firms during an era of economic
transition inChina. These logics affected firms’M&A
decisions via the coalition building by advocates of
each logic, as reflected in the external power source
of ownership and the internal power source of board
representation. The effect of these coalitions was
evident in the decision making of firms and in the
financial market’s response to those decisions.
Finally, our analysis demonstrates that the institu-
tional transition engineered by the Chinese state was
not a straightforward story of one logic displacing
another but rather a contest pitting adherents of the
old, state socialism logic against those of the new,
market capitalism logic. Ultimately the old logic’s
accommodation to the new, together with the new
logic’s penetration of the old, was a strategic process
3 There are 112 SOEs controlled by the central SASAC,
and these firms are widely considered to be the most im-
portant of China’s state-owned enterprises.
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in each firm whereby each coalition sought to in-
crease or maintain its power.
Themain theoretical implication of ourwork is the
need to conduct research on the choices given to
firms by competing institutional logics. Institutional
logics have been viewed as engaging in field wide
competition for prominence and as being driven by
such major events as the founding of firms based on
anew logic and the acquisitionby firmsof targets that
embody a different logic (Marquis & Lounsbury,
2007; Thornton, 2001). Perhaps more importantly,
and as we have investigated, institutional logics can
contend within existing organizations (Durand &
Jourdan, 2012; Shipilov et al., 2010). We describe
how the theory of coalitions can be used to address
the influence of institutional logics in specific firms,
thereby generating new predictions. Our treatment
specifies the effect not only of coalitions within
decision-making groups but also of external power
sources that are called upon to influence organiza-
tional decisions. We show that these effects are ad-
ditive and that they change over time as the power of
each logic evolves, thus lending support to the view
that firms base their decisions—about the actions
suggested by competing logics—on both the external
prominence of each logic and the power backing it in
the firm (e.g., Wry et al., 2013).
A closely related theoretical implication is the po-
tential for institutional logics to coexist for an ex-
tended period of time. Unlike earlier studies of logic
acceptance (Shipilov et al., 2010; Thornton, 2002;
Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) or resistance (Fiss & Zajac,
2004; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Lounsbury, 2007;
Marquis, Glynn, &Davis, 2007), our paper documents
the coexistence of old and new institutional logics
duringChina’speriodofeconomic transitionandshows
that the former could still sway decisions made by
firms in which it held more power. Thus our results
TABLE 4
Ownership Effects on Cumulative Abnormal Returnsa
Variables Window [–1,1] [–1,2] [–1,5] [0,1] [0,2]
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age 20.001 20.000 20.001 20.000 20.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Size 20.016** 20.016** 20.013* 20.014** 20.014**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Market to book 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log market value 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Debt to equity 0.000 20.000 20.001 0.000 20.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Free cash flow 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Diversification level 0.001 0.000 20.001 20.000 20.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Cumulative M&A experience 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Foreign ownership 20.090 20.074 20.063 20.098 20.083
(0.063) (0.063) (0.065) (0.063) (0.063)
Financial misconduct 20.038 20.031 20.023 20.035 20.028
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
State ownership 20.059* 20.058* 20.059* 20.057* 20.055*
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Legal-person ownership 0.022 0.015 0.019 0.028 0.022
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
F-test (120, 2315) 3.73** 3.81** 3.81** 3.83** 3.92**
R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17
a The chosen windows represent typical cutoffs for tests of short-term reactions to events. Robust standard errors clustered on firms in
parentheses.
*p , 0.05
**p ,0.01; two-sided hypothesis tests.
688 AprilAcademy of Management Journal
run counter to studies that view institutional logics as
being constant within a given firm or that view the
industry-specific dominance of a particular logic as
beingdrivenby the founding and/or failure of firms in
that industry. This implication is also distinct from
the idea of “hybrid” logics (Battilana&Dorado, 2010),
since rather than amelding of viewpointswe find that
each coalition favors promoting its own agenda. De-
spite facing concerted resistance, market-oriented
M&As were an increasingly frequent activity that re-
flected China’s gradual transition to the market logic,
andwerealso seen in firmswithhighstate ownership.
On the boards of firms across the spectrum of own-
ership types, coalitions coexisted and their associated
directors jointly shaped firm decisions.
A practical implication is that the study under-
scores the central role of coalition building in
determining key strategic actions, especially con-
tested ones. Initiation of M&A strategies and the se-
lection of targets is primarily a top management
activity, and we built this study on the premise that
top management would either form strategies that
matched the preferences of the board, or see actions
deviated from those preferences defeated often
enough that the actual firm M&As would be pre-
dictable from board characteristics as well as firm
ownership. As a result, board member experience
influenced the coalition building. There is much
research on how top management seeks to influence
boards (Westphal & Bednar, 2008), but this should
not lead researchers to overlook board decision-
making and the role of power relations within the
board (Ocasio, 1994).
A second practical implication of this work—with
considerable theoretical interest as well— is the
emphasis on differences in the institutional logics
promoted by different types of firm owners. The va-
riety of ownership groups in Chinese firms and their
respective origins allowed us to: (1) observe closely
how divergent interests representing different logics
affect both goal selection and decision making; and
(2) see a path leading to a more comprehensive ex-
amination of the goals held by different owners.
Much research in the Western economic context
treats owners as a homogeneous group and thus
presumes that all owners share the same goal of
maximizing shareholder value (Bagwell, 1991; Fiss&
Zajac, 2004). However, research on family busi-
nesses and business groups often uncover evidence
of owner conflicts (Chung & Luo, 2008; Miller,
Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2010). Research on in-
stitutional owners is often phrased as a conflict be-
tween top management and owners (Shipilov et al.,
2010; Westphal & Bednar, 2008), but it is also
noteworthy—and often overlooked—that institu-
tional owners have specific interests that may not
overlap completely with those of other owners. In-
deed, such conflicts of interest were highly prom-
inent when researchers first started examining the
actions of funds taking over firms to break them up,
as suchbreak-up takeoverswere initially vilified also
by many other owners, before gaining acceptance
(Hirsch, 1986). The managerial implications of such
work is clear from research that has examined the
effect of different ownership when firms seek to
pursue specific strategies such as adopting the mul-
tidivisional form (Palmer, Jennings, &Zhou, 1993) or
engaging in M&As (Palmer, Barber, & Zhou, 1995).
Top management choice of strategy is not only
adapted to board member backgrounds, but also to
ownership configurations (Ansari, Fiss, & Zajac,
2010; Davis & Stout, 1992; Palmer & Barber, 2001).
These theoretical and practical implications are of
particular interest because they are drawn from
a context involving environmental changes more
radical andhence challenging for the firms thanmost
work on institutional change. For example, the
institutionalization of organizational structure
(Tolbert & Zucker, 1983), the diffusion of new gov-
ernance practices (Davis & Greve, 1997), and the
adoption of governance reforms (Shipilov et al.,
2010) are all adjustments that can be made without
compromising the institutional logic of market cap-
italism. Yet China’s institutional transition from
state socialism tomarket capitalismwas a revolution
in both the economic and cultural sense. The emer-
gence of various types of corporate ownership (state,
private, and public) facilitates a greater understand-
ing of how competing logics originate. The diverse
interests and rationales that underlie these compet-
ing logics, when combined with the variance in
firms’ strategic decisions, allow us to account more
accurately for how a transition in the external in-
stitutional environment is followed by firms’ het-
erogeneous responses to that transition (Battilana &
Dorado, 2010; Capron & Guillen, 2009; Peng, 2003).
In sum, we have shown how institutional change
and competing institutional logics give firms the
ability to choose between alternative strategic ac-
tions, but also entail competing pressures from the
advocates of each action (Greenwood et al., 2011).
Research that addresses this issue often invokes the
theory of coalitions and power use (Cyert & March,
1963; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) in arguing that firm
goals and behaviors are neither isomorphic across
firms nor stable over time; rather, those factors vary
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depending on the strength of the coalition support-
ing each action. In our research we observed varia-
tion in M&As across firms, and these variations
followed the patterns predicted by the strength of
coalition power sources in each firm. We also found
temporal shifts as external acceptance of the new
logic increased. These effects are unsurprising when
the firm’s decisions are viewed as being influenced
by coalitions (built mainly by groups of managers)
with different goals and different sources of power.
Looking at institutional logics from the firm point
of view is a promising path for further research. Fu-
ture work could follow our lead in examining the
board of directors as a decision-making body in
which owner configurations and personal experi-
ences shape the formationof coalitionswhenmaking
decisions. Different ownership types can be exam-
ined, and personal experiences can be investigated
more specifically through following the work expe-
rience of each director (Fligstein, 1987). Similarly,
top management teams vary in composition and ex-
perience, and influence both strategic and opera-
tional decisions (Hambrick, 2007). These influences
can be revealed through research that sees experi-
ence as a source of commitment to logics, and co-
alition building as a central part of organizational
decision-making. An even deeper investigation of
coalition building would examine compromises
made across agenda items and relations among
managerial careers, participation, and power in de-
cision making. Work along these lines will surely
prove fruitful, and the evidence presented in this
paper is a good first step toward examining coalitions
in decision making when firms are faced with alter-
native actions backed by competing institutional
logics.
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